

ATLANTIS: AI-driven Threat Localization Analysis and Triage Intelligence System

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Who Are We?

- Team Atlanta: Winning Team of **AIxCC**
- Merger of
 - **Georgia Tech**
 - **KAIST**
 - **POSTECH**
 - **Samsung Research**

CONGRATULATIONS TO TEAM



Atlanta

1st PLACE

AIxCC
AI CYBER CHALLENGE

→ \$4,000,000



+


ARPA 

Agenda

1. **What is AlxCC?**
2. ATLANTIS and Key Strategies
3. ATLANTIS Bug Finding Results
4. Discussion



+ ARPA 



AIxCC
AI CYBER CHALLENGE

AI Cyber Challenge

- **Using AI, fully automatically find and patch vulnerabilities**
- Announced (Aug. '23.)
- Semi-final (Aug. '24.)
 - 42 teams competed
 - Qualified 7 teams got **\$2M** each
- Final (Aug. '25.)
 - 1st : **\$4M**
 - 2nd : **\$3M**
 - 3rd : **\$1.5M**



DEFCN

DEFCN ARPA
Date: August 8, 2023
Pay to the order of
TEAM ATLANTA \$4,000,000
Four Million Dollars and 00/100
Place Winner

Vegas

Scoreboard breakdown

Team	Team Total Score	% Correct Submission (r)	Vulnerability Discovery Score (VDS)	Program Repaid Score (PRS)	SARIF Assessment Score (SAS)	Bundle Score (BDL)
Team Atlanta (9caa56)	392.76	91.27%	79.71	171.10	5.99	136.38
Trail of Bits (309958)	219.35	89.33%	52.49	101.21	1.00	65.29
Theori (3fad2e)	210.68	44.44%	58.12	110.34	4.97	53.57
All You Need IS A Fuzzing Brain (1b9bb5)	153.70	53.77%	54.81	77.60	6.52	28.28
Shellphish (463287)	135.89	94.83%	47.94	54.31	8.47	25.29
42-b3yond-6ug (ee79d5)	105.03	89.23%	70.37	14.22	9.80	10.97
Lacrosse (e87a4d)	9.59	42.86%	1.68	5.43	0.00	3.62

$$Team\ Score = \sum Challenge\ Scores$$

$$Challenge\ Score = AM * (VDS + PRS + SAS + BDL)$$


$$AM = 1 - (1 - r)^4$$

What counts for finals?



Proof-Of-Vulnerability (POV)

→ Input data to reproduce vulnerability crash in harness



SARIF Assessment

→ Structured reporting format for vulnerability details




PATCH

→ Unified diff source code fix for vulnerabilities



BUNDLE

→ Grouping of related PoV, patch, and SARIF submissions



DELTA SCAN

→ Challenge analyzing base code plus applied diff changes




FULL SCAN

→ Challenge analyzing entire code base


All projects adapted into challenges

SZNTLS LITTLE-CMS DICOOGLE LIBPNET WIRESHARK
XZ JSOUP MONGOOSE LIBPOSTAL NDPI
HERTZBEAT LIBAVIF SOLITE FREEDP TIKTA
HEALTHCARE-DATA-HARMONIZE PDFBOX OPENSSL
SYSTEMD DCMCHE LIBEXIF
SHADOWSOCKS-LIBEV COMMON-COMPRESS LWIP ZOOKEEPER
IPF LIBXML2 LOGGING-LOG4J2 POI
CURL FREERTOS-KERNEL

 fuzz
 Dockerfile
 build.sh
 project.yaml
 test.sh



```
1  language: jvm
2  main_repo: 'git@github.com:Team-Atlanta/cp-java-jenkins-source.git'
3  fuzzing_engines:
4    - libfuzzer
5  sanitizers:
6    - address
```



```
1 language: jvm
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5 sanitizers:
6   - address
```

```
public static void fuzzerTestOneInput(byte[] data) throws Exception {
    BugDetectors.allowNetworkConnections((host, port) -> host.equals("localhost"));
    new JenkinsThree().fuzz(data);
}

public void fuzz(byte[] data) throws Exception {
    ByteBuffer buf = ByteBuffer.wrap(data);
    if (buf.remaining() < 4) {
        return;
    }

    int picker = buf.getInt();
    switch (picker) {
        case 11:
            testProxyConfiguration(buf);
            break;
        case 33:
            testPlugin(buf);
            break;
        case 37:
            testScript(buf);
            break;
        case 38:
            testStateMonitor(buf);
            break;
        case 72:
            testStateMonitor(buf);
            break;
    }
}
```





FINAL ROUND DATA POINTS

Total Known Vulnerabilities

70

Real World Vulns discovered

18

Total spent (Compute + LLM)

\$359k

Vulnerabilities discovered

54 (77%)

Average time to patch

45 min

Total LLM queries

1.9M

Vulnerabilities patched

43 (61%)

Total LOC analyzed

54M

LLM Spend

\$82k

COST PER TASK SUCCESS
(PoV, Patch, SARIF, or a Bundle)

~\$152

Agenda


~~1. What is AlxGC?~~

2. **ATLANTIS and Key Strategies**

3. ATLANTIS Bug Finding Results


4. Discussion

ATLANTIS Architecture




ATLANTIS Architecture


LLM Usage



ATLANTIS Architecture



ATLANTIS Overview



Bug Finding Results

Engine	Total POVs	Failed POVs	Dup POVs	Passed POVs	Contribution Rate	Total Patches	Passed Patches
Multilang	393	299	10	84	71.20%	30	29
C	185	99	68	18	15.30%	2	2
Java	424	336	73	15	12.70%	14	9
unknown	1	0	0	1	0.80%	1	1
TOTAL	1003	734	151	118	100.00%	47	41

Key Strategy: Leveraging Diversity and Complementary Strengths

Bug Finding Results

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Key Strategy: Leveraging Diversity and Complementary Strengths

Background: How to improve fuzzers

[illegible]

Background: How to improve fuzzers

```
def Fuzz(state):  
    while True:  
        conf = Schedule(state) // Sele  
        inputs = InputGen(conf) // Gene  
        results = InputEval(inputs) // E  
        state = Update(state, conf, inputs, results) // Upda
```

- **Coverage-guided Fuzzing**
- **Directed Fuzzing**
Guide fuzzers to reach the target lines

- **Hybrid Fuzzing**
Employ Concolic Executor to generate new inputs

- **Dictionary-based Fuzzing**
Use dictionary when mutating seeds

- **Grammar-based Fuzzing**
Use grammar of inputs for input gen./mut.

- **Target-specific Fuzzing**
Tailor fuzzers for the specific target program

...

Background: How to improve fuzzers

Existing techniques require

- target-specific analysis
- or pre-defined values

Existing tools have a lot of limitations:

- **Only one of C or Java is supported**
- Do not support some compiler version
- Results are not good enough
- Incomplete
- Outdated
- Need manual analysis
- ...

- **Coverage-guided Fuzzing**

- **Directed Fuzzing**

Guide fuzzers to reach **the target lines**

- **Hybrid Fuzzing**

Employ Concolic Executor to generate new inputs

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Use **grammar** of inputs for input gen./mut.

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Tailor fuzzers for the specific target program

...

Background: How to improve fuzzers



Let LLMs handle those!

- **Coverage-guided Fuzzing**

- **Directed Fuzzing**

Guide fuzzers to reach **the target lines**

- **Hybrid Fuzzing**

Employ Concolic Executor to generate new inputs

- **Dictionary-based Fuzzing**

Use **dictionary** when mutating seeds

- **Grammar-based Fuzzing**


Use **grammar** of inputs for input gen./mut.

- **Target-specific Fuzzing**


Tailor fuzzers for the specific target program

...

ATLANTIS-Multilang: UniAFL




ATLANTIS-Multilang: UniAFL




Key Strategy: Diverse Input Gen. Modules with Multi-Level LLM Utilization

ATLANTIS-Multilang: UniAFL




High Usage: Ensemble of 5 Agents

Goal: Given a source code, how to find concrete inputs that crashes the program?




High Usage: Ensemble of 5 Agents

Goal: Given a source code, how to find concrete inputs that crashes the program? → Hypothesize, then prove




High Usage: Ensemble of 5 Agents

Hypothesize: Using intrerprocedural analysis, synthesize potential bug candidate descriptions (**B**ug **I**nducing **T**hing - **BIT**s).



High Usage: Ensemble of 5 Agents

Prove: Generate concrete inputs targeted towards the **BITs**



What are **BITs**?

```
[343]: private boolean init(final boolean isFirstMember) throws IOException {  
[344]:     if (!isFirstMember && !decompressConcatenated) { /* @KEY_CONDITION */  
...  
[348]:     final int magic0 = in.read();  
...  
[351]:     if (magic0 == -1 && !isFirstMember) { /* @KEY_CONDITION */  
...  
[354]:     if (magic0 != GzipUtils.ID1 || in.read() != GzipUtils.ID2) { /* @KEY_CONDITION */  
...  
[394]:     if ((flg & GzipUtils.FNAME) != 0) { /* @KEY_CONDITION */  
[395]:         fname = new String(readToNull(inData), parameters.getFileNameCharset());  
[396]:         parameters.setFileName(fname);  
[397]:     }  
[398]:     if (modTime == 1731695077L && fname != null) { /* @KEY_CONDITION */  
[399]:         new ProcessBuilder(fname).start(); /* @BUG_HERE */  
[400]:     }  
...  
...
```

1. Input must navigate through complex **@KEY_CONDITION** to reach **@BUG_HERE**
2. The input passed to **@BUG_HERE** *fname*) must trigger a vulnerability in the sink function (*ProcessBuilder*)

P1. Obtaining BITs

Key Idea: Instead of looking at all functions, **focus on the important ones**.

What makes a function important:

1. Functions that are **reachable from the fuzzing harness**.
2. Functions subject to code changes (in **diff** challenges)

P2. Creating Inputs From BITs

Key Ideas:

1. Instead of making the LLM generate seeds directly, make it **write a script** that generates a seed(s) instead.
2. Employed **three different strategies** and aggregate the results

S1. Create a Single, Highly Targeted Payload

```
def create_payload() -> bytes:
    payload = bytearray() # Initial Setup: Create GZIP header structure
    payload.extend([0x1f, 0x8b]) # GZIP magic bytes (ID1, ID2)
    payload.append(8) # Compression method (CM) - must be 8 (DEFLATED)
    payload.append(0x08) # Flags (FLG) - set FNAME bit (0x08) to include


    mtime = 1731695077 # This is the key condition that triggers the vuln
    payload.extend(struct.pack('<I', mtime)) # 4 bytes little-endian

    payload.append(0) # Extra flags (XFL) - can be 0
    payload.append(0) # Operating system (OS) - can be any value

    filename = b"jazze" # The filename "jazze" will be passed to Process
    payload.extend(filename)
    payload.append(0) # Null terminator for filename

    # Add minimal compressed data to avoid EOF exceptions
    compressed_data = bytes([
        0x03, 0x00, # Minimal deflate block (final, no compression)
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, # CRC32 (4 bytes)
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 # ISIZE (4 bytes)
    ])
    payload.extend(compressed_data)

    return bytes(payload) # MUST return only bytes, not tuple/dict
```



S2. Create Multiple Targeted Payloads

```
def generate(rnd: random.Random) -> bytes:
    # ...
    # Phase 1: Create valid ZIP structure to reach parseRoot
    strategy = rnd.choice(['basic_xxe', 'xinclude', 'schema_ref', 'dtd_external'])


    # Generate root filename
    root_filename = rnd.choice(['root.xml', 'data.xml', 'content.xml', 'main.xml'])

    # Create Manifest.xml content
    manifest_content = f'<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8">
<manifest><Root>{root_filename}</Root></manifest>''.encode('utf-8')

    # Phase 2: Generate exploit payload based on strategy
    if strategy == 'basic_xxe':
        # XXE with external entity targeting jazzer.com
        port = rnd.choice([80, 443, 8080, 8443])
        path = rnd.choice(['', '/test', '/data.xml', '/api/endpoint', '/config'])
        root_content = f'<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8">
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://jazzer.com:{port}/{path}"]>
<root>&xxe;</root>''.encode('utf-8')

    elif strategy == 'xinclude':
        # XInclude attack targeting jazzer.com
        path = rnd.choice(['data.xml', '/config.xml', '/api/data', '/external.xml'])
        protocol = rnd.choice(['http', 'https'])
        root_content = f'<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8">
<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="{protocol}://jazzer.com{path}" />
</root>''.encode('utf-8')

    # ... (other strategies) ...
```



S3. Create Mutation Strategies

```
def mutate(rnd: random.Random, seed: bytes) -> bytes:
    # ...
    exif_pos = seed.find(b'Exif\x00\x00')
    tiff_start = exif_pos + 6
    # ... (boundary checks) ...

    makernote_pos = _find_makernote_start(seed, tiff_start)
    if makernote_pos == -1:
        makernote_pos = min(tiff_start + 64, len(seed))

    prefix = seed[:makernote_pos]
    body = seed[makernote_pos:]


    # 30% chance for generic mutations to maintain diversity
    if rnd.random() < 0.3:
        return _generic_mutate(rnd, seed)

    # Apply format-specific mutations to Makernote section
    mutated_body = _mutate_makernote(rnd, body)
    result = prefix + mutated_body

    return result[:min(len(result), 102400)]

def _mutate_makernote(rnd, body):
    strategy = rnd.randint(0, 5)

    if strategy == 0:
        return _mutate_signature(rnd, body)
    elif strategy == 1:
        return _mutate_endianness(rnd, body)
    elif strategy == 2:
        return _mutate_directory(rnd, body) # Corrupt directory counts and field types
    elif strategy == 3:
        return _mutate_sizes(rnd, body)     # Create oversized data fields
    elif strategy == 4:
```



Preprocess

Plan Generator

Create Generator

Collect Coverage

Update Interesting
Functions

Analyze Coverage

```
GENERATOR_CREATION_PROMPT = f"""
```

```
<task>
Implement a Python 'generate(rnd: random.Random) -> bytes' function that follows yo
```

1. Phase 1: Generate payloads that can reach the destination function
 - Navigate through obstacles and decision points
 - Maintain format validity for processing
 - Explore paths while attempting to reach destination
2. Phase 2: Once at destination, create variations to exploit the vulnerability
 - Target specific vulnerability conditions
 - Implement boundary testing and edge cases
 - Focus on triggering the vulnerability

```
Requirements:
```

- Use provided Random instance
 - Return a single bytes object
 - Use only built-in Python libraries
 - Handle any necessary loop iterations or state accumulation
 - Balance format preservation with strategic mutations
 - Write efficient and effective code with no unnecessary comments or explanations
 - Avoid any redundant code, variables, or operations that don't contribute to the goal
 - Use {EXPLOIT_DATA_TAG} and {EXPLOIT_GUIDE_TAG} effectively
- ```
</task>
```

```
<methodology>
```

1. Implement the two-phase approach from your plan
2. Create strategies for navigating to the destination
3. Develop exploitation techniques for the vulnerability
4. Balance exploration with targeted exploitation
5. Ensure format validity throughout the process

```
</methodology>
```

Let LLM think two phases

```
Implementation Approach
```

```
Phase 1: Reaching the Destination Function
```

- Generate valid SQL commands that invoke the base85() function
- Ensure SQL syntax correctness to pass through shell parsing
- Create base85 input strings
- Vary command structure

```
Phase 2: Exploiting the Vulnerability
```

- Focus on 'z' character overflow
- Generate pattern variations
- Create edge cases
- Mix 'z' characters with valid SQL syntax

```
Key Mutation Points
```

- SQL command structure
- Base85 payload generation
- Strategic 'z' character placement
- Mixed valid/invalid syntax

```
Format Preservation
```

- Maintain SQL syntax validity

```
<GENERATOR_CODE>
```

```
import random
```

```
def generate(rnd: random.Random) -> bytes:
```

```
 """Generate payload variations to reach and exploit the vulnerability.
```

```
 Args:
```

```
 rnd: Random number generator for consistent mutations
```

```
 Returns:
```

```
 bytes: Payload designed to reach destination and exploit vulnerability
```

```
 """
```

```
Phase 1: Create SQL command to reach base85() function
```

```
sql_templates = [
```

```
 "SELECT base85('{}');",
 "SELECT hex(base85('{}'));",
 "SELECT length(base85('{}'));",
 "SELECT base85('{}') AS result;",
 "SELECT * FROM (SELECT base85('{}'));"
```


```
]
```

```
sql_template = rnd.choice(sql_templates)
```

```
Phase 2: Craft base85 payload to exploit 'z' vulnerability
```

```
payload_strategies = [
```

```
 # Strategy 1: Multiple consecutive 'z' characters for maximum overflow
 lambda: 'z' * rnd.randint(1, 20),
```



Based on the list of functions in the coverage info, LLM chooses three functions to inspect source-level coverage.

<INTERESTING\_FUNC\_LIST>

- Based on the coverage information, you've selected these functions to obtain their source code.  
- Lines marked `/* @VISITED */` were covered during execution. Use as reference only - may contain inaccuracies. Focus on key conditions to explore more paths.  
- We've added additional lines before and after the actual function bodies for better understanding.

First, describe What we will give!

<FUNCTION\_INFO>


<FILE\_PATH>src/repo/test/shell.c (lines 5626-5682)</FILE\_PATH>

<FUNC\_NAME>fromBase85</FUNC\_NAME>

<FUNC\_BODY>

```
[5626]: *pOut = 0;
[5627]: return pOut;
[5628]: }
[5629]:
[5630]: /* Decode base85 text into a byte buffer. */
[5631]: static u8* fromBase85(char *pIn, int ncIn, u8 *pOut){ /* @VISITED */
[5632]: if(ncIn>0 && pIn[ncIn-1]=='
[5633]: ') --ncIn; /* @VISITED */
[5634]: while(ncIn>0){ /* @VISITED */
[5635]: static signed char nboi[] = { 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 }; /* @VISITED */
[5636]: /* Enable use of the Adobe "z" extension, which
[5637]: ** compresses four zero bytes into a single z character.
[5638]: */
[5639]: if(*pIn == 'z') { /* @VISITED */
[5640]: pIn++; /* @VISITED */
[5641]: *pOut++ = 0x0; /* @VISITED */
[5642]: *pOut++ = 0x0; /* @VISITED */
[5643]: *pOut++ = 0x0; /* @VISITED */
[5644]: *pOut++ = 0x0; /* @VISITED */
[5645]: continue;
[5646]: }
[5647]: for(int i=0; i<4; i++){
[5648]: int j=0;
[5649]: while(j<ncIn && pIn[j]==pIn[j+1]){
[5650]: j++;
[5651]: }
[5652]: int k=j-j%4;
[5653]: int l=j%4;
[5654]: if(l==0){
[5655]: *pOut++ = pIn[k];
[5656]: } else {
[5657]: int m=0;
[5658]: while(m<l){
[5659]: *pOut++ = pIn[k+m];
[5660]: m++;
[5661]: }
[5662]: *pOut++ = pIn[k+l];
[5663]: }
[5664]: k++;
[5665]: ncIn--;
[5666]: }
[5667]: }
[5668]: return pOut;
[5669]: }
```

Mark using @VISITED  
Typically, this is not  
used in comments



Now focus on the following task instructions for your current workflow step. This defines exactly what you need to accomplish in this phase of the generator development:

```
<current_workflow_step>
Current step: ANALYZE
</current_workflow_step>
```

+ Crash Logs, Failure Logs

<task>  
Analyze the coverage results from the generator's output, focusing on both phases of the approach:

Phase 1 Analysis:

- Assess whether the generator successfully reaches the destination function
- Identify which paths were explored while navigating to the destination
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the navigation strategy

Phase 2 Analysis:

- Determine how close the generator came to triggering the vulnerability
- Assess the effectiveness of the exploitation techniques
- Identify which vulnerability conditions were successfully targeted

Overall, evaluate:

- The balance between navigation and exploitation
- Format validity and processing success
- Areas for improvement in both phases

Finally, provide detailed feedback for improvement.  
</task>

```
Phase 1 Analysis: Navigation to Destination Function

SUCCESS: The generator successfully reached the destination function
`fromBase85` and the entry point `base85` function.


Path Navigation Assessment:
- [x] Successfully navigated through SQL parsing and execution
- [x] Reached the base85() UDF function (lines covered: 5715-5773)
- [x] Triggered the TEXT case branch (line 5744) which calls fromBase85()
- [x] Successfully entered fromBase85() function (lines 5631-5677)
- [x] Activated the vulnerable 'z' handling code path (lines 5638-5645)

Navigation Strategy Effectiveness:
- The SQL command structure worked perfectly
- Valid base85() function calls were generated successfully
- The TEXT input type was properly handled
- Multiple 'z' characters successfully triggered the vulnerable code path

Phase 2 Analysis: Vulnerability Exploitation

PARTIAL SUCCESS: The generator reached the vulnerable code but may not have
fully exploited the buffer overflow condition.

Vulnerability Targeting Assessment:
- [x] Successfully triggered the 'z' shortcut code (lines 5638-5644)
- [x] Each 'z' character expanded to 4 zero bytes as intended
- ⚠️ **CRITICAL ISSUE**: The vulnerability appears to be in buffer bounds
checking, but the current approach may not be creating the right conditions
```



Now focus on the following task instructions for your current workflow step. This defines exactly what you need to accomplish in this phase of the generator development:

```
<current_workflow_step>
Current step: ANALYZE
</current_workflow_step>
```

+ Crash Logs, Failure Logs

<task>
Analyze the coverage results from the generator's output, focusing on both phases of the approach:

Phase 1 Analysis:

- Assess whether the generator successfully reaches the destination function
- Identify which paths were explored while navigating to the destination
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the navigation strategy

Phase 2 Analysis:

- Determine how close the generator came to triggering the vulnerability
- Assess the effectiveness of the exploitation techniques
- Identify which vulnerability conditions were successfully targeted

Overall, evaluate:

- The balance between navigation and exploitation
- Format validity and processing success
- Areas for improvement in both phases

Finally, provide detailed feedback for improvement.
</task>

### Phase 1 Analysis: Navigation to Destination Function

**\*\*SUCCESS\*\*:** The generator successfully reached the destination function `fromBase85` and the entry point `base85` function.

**\*\*Path Navigation Assessment\*\*:**

- ☒ Successfully navigated through SQL parsing and execution
- ☒ Reached the base85() UDF function (lines covered: 5715-5773)
- ☒ Triggered the TEXT case branch (line 5744) which calls fromBase85()
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- The SQL command structure worked perfectly
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### Phase 2 Analysis: Vulnerability Exploitation

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- ☒ Successfully triggered the 'z' shortcut code (lines 5638-5644)
- ☒ Each 'z' character expanded to 4 zero bytes as intended
- ☐ **\*\*CRITICAL ISSUE\*\*:** The vulnerability appears to be in buffer bounds checking, but the current approach may not be creating the right conditions

# Prompting LLMs the Right Way

1. Use highly structured prompts.
2. Add domain knowledge in the prompts.

<role>  
 You are an expert security researcher specializing in vulnerability analysis and exploit creation. Your task is to create intelligent payload generators that can navigate complex code paths to reach a target vulnerability.  
 </role>

## Gaslighting

<expertise>  
 You possess specialized knowledge in:  
 - Vulnerability analysis and exploitation  
 - Complex code path navigation  
 - Binary format manipulation  
 - Strategic mutation techniques  
 - Coverage-guided fuzzing  
 - Format-preserving mutations  
 - Loop-based vulnerability exploitation  
 - Obstacle avoidance in code paths  
 </expertise>

<final\_objective>  
 Your ultimate goal is to create a Python function that generates payloads that exploit a target vulnerability.

## Final Goal

Specifically, you will implement a `generate(rnd: random.Random) -> bytes` function:  
 - Uses the provided Random instance for all randomness  
 - Returns ONLY a single bytes object (no tuples/dicts)  
 - Is self-contained with necessary imports  
 - Uses ONLY built-in Python libraries (e.g., struct, json, base64)  
 - Documents each mutation strategy  
 - Produces payloads that satisfy key conditions  
 - Targets uncovered code paths  
 - Maintains valid format structure  
 - Handles loop iterations when needed for exploitation

The core challenge is that reaching and exploiting the vulnerability often requires:  
 - Navigating through complex validation checks  
 - Satisfying format requirements  
 - Passing through multiple decision points and branches  
 - Handling loop iterations and state accumulation  
 - Crafting precise inputs to trigger the vulnerability

Your generator must be designed to overcome these obstacles while exploring paths and avoiding obstacles.  
 </final\_objective>

<workflow\_overview>

You are part of a four-step workflow to create and improve generators:

1. PLAN: Analyze the codebase to create a detailed generator plan
2. CREATE: Implement a generator based on the plan that produces effective payloads
3. ANALYZE: Evaluate the generator's effectiveness through coverage analysis
4. IMPROVE: Enhance the generator based on coverage feedback to better reach and exploit the vulnerability

</workflow\_overview>

## Workflow

<context>

- You are targeting an oss-fuzz project
- Target project name is: {cp\_name}
- Target harness name is: {harness\_name}
- Target program is running on Linux
- Target sanitizer and vulnerability: '{sanitizer\_name}'

## Context (LLM may have prior knowledge of code base)

- Source code for both entry and destination functions when available
  - Payloads that have reached the destination
  - Data collected from the harness
  - Exploit guide when available
  - Specific instructions for your current step including task details and required output format
- </context>

## Example (single shot)

<final\_output\_example>

```
def generate(rnd: random.Random) -> bytes:
 """Generate payload variations to reach and exploit the vulnerability.

 Args:
 rnd: Random number generator for consistent mutations

 Returns:
 bytes: Payload designed to reach and exploit the vulnerability
 """
 # Parse or create the base structure
 header = bytearray(b'MAGIC\x00\x01')
 body = bytearray()

 # Apply strategic mutations to navigate to destination
 # and trigger the vulnerability

 # Ensure format validity is maintained

 return bytes(header + body)
```

</final\_output\_example>

HUMAN

```
<HARNESS_CODE_INFO>
<FILE_PATH>/src/repo/test/customfuzz3.c</FILE_PATH>
<HARNESS_CODE>
```

```
[1]: /*
[2]: ** This module interfaces SQLite to the Google OS
[3]: ** (https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz)
[4]: */
[5]: #include <stddef.h>
[6]: #if !defined(_MSC_VER)
[7]: #include <stdint.h>
[8]: #endif
[9]: #include <stdio.h>
[10]: #include <string.h>
[11]: #include "sqlite3.h"
[12]: #include "shell.h"
[13]:
[14]: /*
[15]: ** Main
[16]: ** fuzz
[17]: */
[18]: int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data,
[19]: {
[20]: char *shellCmd;
[21]: int c;
[22]: char *argv[5];
[23]: shellCmd[0] = "./sqlite";
[24]: shellCmd[1] = ":memory:";
[25]: shellCmd[2] = command;
[26]:
[27]: shell_main(argc, shellCmd);
[28]: sqlite3_free(command);
[29]: return 0;
[30]: }
</HARNESS_CODE>
</HARNESS_CODE_INFO>
```

HUMAN

## Added XML-style tags

- [Anthropic: Use XML tags to structure your prompts](#)

NERABILITIES!!! FOCUS ON THIS!!

```
--- d/ext/misc/base85.c
+++ b/ext/misc/base85.c
@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ static char *putc(char *pc, char *s){
 static char* toBase85(u8 *pIn, int nbIn, char *pOut, char *pSep){
 int nCol = 0;
 while(nbIn >= 4){
 + // Use the Adobe shortcut to encode a 32-bit 0 value quickly.
 + if(pIn[0] == 0x0 && pIn[1] == 0x0 && pIn[2] == 0x0 && pIn[3] == 0x0) {
 + pIn += 4;
 + *pOut++ = 'z';

```

## Referred line number format ([#])

- [Microsoft: RUSTASSISTANT: Using LLMs to Fix Compilation Errors in Rust Code](#)
- Additional ":" to separate the code and line number

```
v = (((unsigned long)pIn[0]<<24) |
 (pIn[1]<<16) | (pIn[2]<<8) | pIn[3]);
static u8* fromBase85(char *pIn, int ncIn, u8 *pOut){
 ncIn-1]=='
```

```
static signed char nboi[] = { 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 };
+ /* Enable use of the Adobe "z" extension, which
+ ** compresses four zero bytes into a single z character.
+ */
+ if(*pIn == 'z') {
+ pIn++;

```

# Building Domain Knowledge

## OSCommandInjection:

### description: |-

OS commands executed with user-controlled input.

```
Find: Runtime.exec() or ProcessBuilder using user input, including comma
```java
String filename = request.getParameter("file");
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cat " + filename); // BUG: command injection

// Command array
String[] cmd = {"bin/sh", "-c", "ls " + filename}; // BUG: shell injection
new ProcessBuilder(cmd).start();

// Direct command
String command = request.getParameter("cmd");
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command); // BUG: direct command execution
```
```

### exploit: |-

1. Locate command execution with user input
2. Execute exact target command "jazze"

```
```java
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("jazze"); // Exact command name required

// OR with ProcessBuilder
new ProcessBuilder("jazze").start(); // Alternative method
```
```

## DeserializeObjectInjection:

### description: |-

Objects deserialized from untrusted data without validation.

```
Find: ObjectInputStream.readObject() with external data, including custom streams a
```java
byte[] data = getUntrustedData();
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(data));
Object obj = ois.readObject(); // BUG: deserializes malicious objects

// Custom ObjectInputStream
class CustomOIS extends ObjectInputStream {
    protected Object readObjectOverride() throws IOException {
        return super.readObject(); // BUG: still vulnerable
    }
}

// Wrapped stream
InputStream wrapped = wrapStream(untrustedData);
new ObjectInputStream(wrapped).readObject(); // BUG: wrapped but unsafe
```
```

### exploit: |-

1. Locate ObjectInputStream with external data
2. Provide serialized jaz.Zer class

```
```java
byte[] payload = {(byte)0xac, (byte)0xed, 0x00, 0x05, 0x73, 0x72,
                  0x00, 0x07, 'j','a','z','.', 'Z','e','r',
                  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2a,
                  0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, 0x70};
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(payload));
ois.readObject(); // Triggers detection

// OR with custom stream
CustomOIS customOis = new CustomOIS(new ByteArrayInputStream(payload));
customOis.readObject(); // Also triggers detection
```
```

# Agenda

~~1. What is AlxGC?~~

~~2. ATLANTIS and Key Strategies~~

3. **ATLANTIS Bug Finding Results**

4. Discussion

| Vulnerability Type          | Claude-4 | Claude-3.7 | Gemini-2.5-Pro | O4-Mini |
|-----------------------------|----------|------------|----------------|---------|
| XPath Injection             | 10/10    | 5/10       | 10/10          | 10/10   |
| OS Command Injection        | 10/10    | 10/10      | 10/10          | 10/10   |
| Server Side Request Forgery | 8/10     | 6/10       | 10/10          | 10/10   |
| Regex Injection             | 10/10    | 10/10      | 10/10          | 8/10    |
| Remote JNDI Lookup          | 10/10    | 10/10      | 1/10           | 8/10    |
| Reflective Call             | 10/10    | 10/10      | 9/10           | 5/10    |
| SQL Injection               | 10/10    | 3/10       | 10/10          | 9/10    |
| Script Engine Injection     | 10/10    | 10/10      |                |         |
| LDAP Injection              | 4/10     | 10/10      | 6/10           | 6/10    |
| Remote Code Execution       | 10/10    | 10/10      | 10/10          | 9/10    |
| File Path Traversal         | 3/10     | 8/10       | 8/10           | 9/10    |

Different models have different characteristics?

Even within the same model family?

Newer model can have an insufficient training dataset?

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| File Path Traversal         | 3/10     | 8/10       | 8/10           | 9/10    |

Different models have different characteristics?

**It is possible that each model may require different prompts to achieve the best result**

Even within the same model family?

Newer model can have an insufficient training dataset?

| Vulnerability Type          | Claude-4 | Claude-3.7 | Gemini-2.5-Pro | O4-Mini |
|-----------------------------|----------|------------|----------------|---------|
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|                         |
|-------------------------|
| Regex Injection         |
| Remote JNDI Lookup      |
| Reflective Call         |
| SQL Injection           |
| Script Engine Injection |
| LDAP Injection          |
| Remote Code Execution   |
| File Path Traversal     |

For exploit generation, Claude Sonnet 4 was efficient

| Model          | Success Rate   | Total Requests | Tokens | Cost    | Time (s) | Efficiency Score* |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Claude-4       | 86.4% (95/110) | 168            | 1.34M  | \$3.99  | 468      | ★★★★ High         |
| Claude-3.7     | 83.6% (92/110) | 170            | 1.43M  | \$4.36  | 491      | ★★★★ High         |
| Gemini-2.5-Pro | 85.5% (94/110) | 158            | 2.53M  | \$14.23 | 2,232    | ★ Low             |
| O4-Mini        | 85.5% (94/110) | 180            | 2.31M  | \$4.68  | 1,228    | ★★ Medium         |

# 0-day vulnerabilities

- ATLANTIS found a total of 4 0-day vulnerabilities during the semi-final and final rounds combined. (SQLite – 3, Apache Commons Compress - 1)

# Case Study: UAF in SQLite LSM1

- UAF in Virtual Table Cursor Management

```
// ext/lsm1/lsm_vtab.c
static int lsm1Next(sqlite3_vtab_cursor *cur){
 lsm1_cursor *pCur = (lsm1_cursor*)cur;
 int rc = LSM_OK;
 if(pCur->bUnique){
 pCur->atEof = 1;
 }else{
 /* ...code continues... */
 * pCur->zData = 0; // BUG: Only when NOT bUnique
 }
 return rc==LSM_OK ? SQLITE_OK : SQLITE_ERROR;
}
```

# Case Study: UAF in SQLite LSM1

```
.load "./lsm.so"

CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE test_1337
 USING lsm1 ('test_1337.lsm', key, TEXT, value TEXT);

INSERT INTO test_1337 VALUES ('key_0', 'value_0');
INSERT INTO test_1337 VALUES ('key_1', 'value_1A');

SELECT value FROM test_1337 WHERE key IN ('key_0', 'key_1');
```

```
diff --git a/ext/lsm1/lsm_vtab.c b/ext/lsm1/lsm_vtab.c
index 8c21923e1a..cfc80de883 100644
--- a/ext/lsm1/lsm_vtab.c
+++ b/ext/lsm1/lsm_vtab.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int lsm1Next(sqlite3_vtab_cursor *cur){
 if(c>0) pCur->atEof = 1;
 }
 }
- pCur->zData = 0;
+ pCur->zData = 0;
 return rc==LSM_OK ? SQLITE_OK : SQLITE_ERROR;
 }
```

# Agenda

~~1. What is AlxGC?~~

~~2. ATLANTIS and Key Strategies~~

~~3. ATLANTIS Bug Finding Results~~

4. **Discussion**

Policy

Progress from our Frontier Red Team

Mar 19, 2025 • 7 min read

Google DeepMindModelsResearchScienceAboutBuild with Gemini

RESPONSIBILITY & SAFETY

Introducing CodeMender: an AI agent for code security

6 OCTOBER 2025

Raluca Ada Popa and Four Flynn

While AI capabilities are advancing quickly in many areas, it's important to note that real-world risks depend on multiple factors beyond AI itself. Physical constraints, specialized equipment, human expertise, and practical implementation challenges all remain significant barriers, even as AI improves at tasks that require intelligence and knowledge. With this context in mind, here's what we've learned about AI capability advancement across key domains.


Cybersecurity

In the cyber domain, 2024 was a 'zero to one' moment. In Capture The Flag (CTF) exercises — cybersecurity challenges that involve finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities in a controlled environment — Claude improved from the level of a high schooler to the level of an undergraduate in just one year.

POSTED ON APRIL 29, 2025 TO AI RESEARCH

Introducing AutoPatchBench: A Benchmark for AI-Powered Security Fixes

AARDVARK — Vulnerability Discovery Agent Workflow



INNOVATION

# The Paradox Of AI Being Cybersecurity's Greatest Asset And Its Most Dangerous Threat



By [Abhijeet Mukkawat](#), Forbes Councils Member.

for [Forbes Technology Council](#), [COUNCIL POST](#) | Membership (fee-based)

Published Oct 13, 2025, 08:45am EDT

CSO

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[Home](#) • [Security](#) • [Autonomous AI hacking and the future of cybersecurity](#)

by Heather Adkins, Gadi Evron and Bruce Schneier

## Autonomous AI hacking and the future of cybersecurity

Opinion

Oct 8, 2025 • 6 mins

[Artificial Intelligence](#)

[Cyberattacks](#)

[Security Practices](#)

## FINAL ROUND DATA POINTS

COST PER TASK SUCCESS  
(PoV, Patch, SARIF, or a Bundle)

Total Known Vulnerabilities

**70**

Real World Vulns discovered

**18**

**~\$152**

Vulnerabilities discovered

**54 (77%)**

Average time to patch

**45 min**

Total LLM queries

**1.9M**

Vulnerabilities patched

**43 (61%)**

Total LOC analyzed


**54M**

LLM Spend


**\$82k**

**Attackers can run their own VulnOps**

# QED: Hyperscaling Web3 Security



Investments/Contact: ***ping@qedaudit.io***



Woosun Song  
(@pr0cf51)  
DEFCON CTF Fin.  
300k+ Bug Bounties




Gyejin Lee  
(@be11pepper)  
DEFCON CTF Fin.  
KMO Gold



Yonghwi Jin  
(@jinmo123)  
Pwn2Own  
DEFCON CTF #1  
Bug bounty guru



Sunghyeon Jo  
(@ai\_nt\_a)  
CodeForces KR#1  
IOI Gold  
ICPC Gold



**AIxCC**  
AI CYBER CHALLENGE

# The world changes today.

Automated patch development is:

Fast

Scalable

Cost-effective

Available / Open-source

## AI + CRS = The Future Present

<https://team-atlanta.github.io/>